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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintifiDAppellee, : Case No. 980112-CA 
vs. 
ROBYN R. PEARSON, : Brief of Appellee 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority Number 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State agrees with Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
L Issues Presented 
A. Was the defendant/appellant, Pearson properly convicted of a violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 17-16a-5, Receiving Compensation for Assisting in a 
Transaction involving his employer Millard County, where he was and had been 
employed by Millard County as the County Administrator for many years, and where he 
entered into a private contract with Stansbury Design Associates, a company belonging to 
Joe Urbanik, to do part of the work which Urbanik had contracted to do for Millard 
County, Pearson's employer, and did not file the sworn statement and make the 
1 
disclosure at a public meeting concerning that private contract according to the mandate 
of the said Section?1 
B. Was the Jury properly instructed concerning the mens rea of entering into the 
private contract with Urbanik and failing to file the sworn statement pursuant to the 
Section where the Jury was instructed that they needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Pearson had to have acted knowingly and intentionally in the matter, but did not 
advise them that he had to act with scienter intentions? 
C. Was the defendant/appellant, Pearson properly convicted of theft of services 
where he used County resources to perform his private contractual obligations? 
H. Standards of Review 
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Standards of Review.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case. 
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Nature of the Case. 
BL. Course of Proceedings. 
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Course of Proceedings. 
III. Statement of Facts 
'Pearson has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the Jury verdict of guilty 
on this count. 
2Except the Defendant Pearson has failed to marshall the evidence against him 
from the record. 
2 
Appellant Pearson has mistated the facts, and has failed to marshall the evidence 
that supports the Jury verdict of guilty on Count I and II. Therefore Appellee restates the 
facts. 
The defendant/appellant Robyn Pearson had been employed by Millard County, 
State of Utah, as the "Millard County Administrator" for many years. Generally he 
was hired to assist the Millard County Commission in the daily operation and 
administration of the ongoing county affairs. The commissioners were elected officials 
who spent part time running the affairs of the County. Pearson was needed because of 
his expertise in public administration to assist in the daily operations. [R. 6173 
page 7 and R. 618 page 218 line 16-25 and page 219.] In regards to this case he 
specifically was assigned the work of overseeing the operation of the county's garbage 
collection and disposal program that the county had started voluntarily in about 1986. 
Pearson had assisted in developing that program and had run the program since its 
inception. [R. 617 page 12-14,25; State's Ex. 47 & 48] 
About 1990 the Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 255, which envisioned the 
creation of a state wide solid waste management system or plan. [State's Ex. 1] Joe 
Urbanik was chairman of the State of Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee. 
[State's Ex 5 & 6; R. 618 page 54] Pearson, as County Administrator, worked with the 
3,fR. 617 and 618" refer to volumes I and II of the transcript of the trial. 617 refers to 
volume I and 618 refers to volume II of the transcript according to the page numbering system 
used by the clerk of the court. 
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state people on developing the involvement of counties in the solid waste planning 
process as early as September 1990. [R. 618 page 60-61; State's Ex. 7] Each county in 
the state was to prepare a 20-year plan for itself, and submit it to the state which in turn 
would create the state wide plan based on the counties' plans. Senate Bill 255 was 
funded with $400,000.00 dollars, to be divided up between the counties of the state to 
help pay for the cost of devising the county plans. Millard County's portion of the money 
was about $12,000.00. [State's Ex. 14] 
The State wrote mandatory rules and guidelines for the counties to follow in 
devising the county plans. [State's Ex. 2 & 3] The State entered into an agreement with 
Millard County to give it the $12,000.00 and the county was to, in return, submit a 20-
year plan consistent with the rules and guidelines.This agreement was signed November 
19, 1991 which is an important date in this case.[ State's Ex. 16, Addendum A; State's 
Ex. 41] Pearson called Urbanik on the same day, as he was advised that Urbanik was 
going to privately solicit contracts to prepare the plans for counties in the State, and 
talked to him about doing the work of preparing the plan for Millard County. [R. 618 
page 132 line 6-10] 
Millard County did thereafter enter into a contract with Stansbury Design 
Associates, a business entity of Joe Urbanik, to pay him $11,983.00 to: 
"Provide solid waste management planning services to 
comply with the requirements of S.B. 255, (Utah Solid Waste 
Management Act) The scope of services is based upon the 
Guidelines for County Solid Waste Management Plans and 
rules adopted by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Wast Board 
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for such plans." [State's Ex. 18, Addendum B] 
This contract between Millard County and Urbanik was completely orchestrated 
by Pearson as the Millard County Administrator. [ R. 618 page 226] Urbanik met with the 
Millard County Commissioners in public meeting on June 22, 1992 and, with Pearson, 
told them about Senate Bill 255. [State's Ex. 42] Millard County's obligation under the 
contract with Urbanik was to pay the money to him and to appoint a Representative to act 
on behalf of the County. That appointee was Pearson. [State's Ex. 18, Addendum B]. 
The agreement was signed by Urbanik on June 23, 1992, the day after the commission 
meeting. On the same day, Urbanik wrote a letter to Robyn Pearson and advised him that 
he was hired privately to do part of the work on the waste management plan contract and 
that the money paid by Millard County would be split even with Pearson. [See State's Ex. 
26, Addendum C] This letter also billed Millard County for one-fourth of the contract 
price backdated to November 19, 1991 when Pearson first called Urbanik about the work. 
Millard County signed the agreement with Urbanik on July 6, 1992. [State's Ex. 18 and 
45] 
Pearson never filed the required sworn statement and never made the required 
disclosure in public meeting even though he regularly attended county commission 
meetings throughout all relevant times as part of his duties as Millard County 
Administrator.[R. 617 page 11; State's Ex. 41, 42 and 45] 
The work was in fact split between Urbanik and Pearson. [State's Ex. 4]. Urbanik 
used Ex. 4 to divide the work between him as "SDA" and Pearson as "RP."[R. 618 page 
5 
138] It was a copy of the Plan Review Checklist out of the Draft Guidelines, State's Ex. 
2. Urbanik did in fact pay Pearson half of the money he got for the work from Millard 
County. [R. 618 page 168 line 25] 
Even though the contract was a private one between him and Urbanik, Pearson 
continued to work as the Millard County Administrator, and while so employed he used 
the resources of the county under his control as Administrator to assemble, transcribe and 
fax information to Urbanik which was his obligation to provide under his private contract. 
He used the county's secretaries to type information and letters on county time which 
were part of his private obligations. He used county supplies and fax machines to 
transmit information to Urbanik which was required of him by his private contract. 
[State's Ex. 35 & 54; R. 617 pages 42-47 and R. 618 page 176 line 1-14] 
One of Pearson's obligations under the private contract was to gather tonnage 
information about material that was going into the county's landfill site. Waste material 
was being gathered by county employees and trucks from the dumpster sites around the 
Delta area pursuant to the county's program being administered by Pearson as Millard 
County Administrator. Pearson was in charge of these employees of the county and the 
trucks used to gather the waste. In this capacity, he ordered the county employee, Phil 
Lovell, to weigh truck loads of waste picked up by him over a period of time. The truck 
loads were weighed at the local IFA store and scales in Delta, Utah, which in turn sent a 
bill for the cost of weighing the loads. Pearson then told Lovell to submit the bill to 
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Millard County for payment. Millard County did pay the bill. The information collected 
was furnished by Pearson to Urbanik as part of the private obligation Pearson had under 
his contract with Urbanik. [R. 618 page 295 line 13-25 and 296, 297; State's Ex. 46] 
The value of these unauthorized uses of County services, was as follows; weighing 
services were worth at least $75.00 [State's Ex. 46] and secretarial services were worth at 
least $5.50 [Def.'s Ex. 56] for a total more than nominal but less than $100.00, a Class B 
Misdomeanor pursuant to U.C.A 76-6-412(l)(d) in effect at that time. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument I: Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Pearson's ignorance of this law 
is no excuse. Pearson's attempt to isolate out the requirement to file the sworn statement 
and make the disclosures, as the only prohibited conduct under Section 17-16a-5 of the 
Utah Code is not correct. Pearson was prohibited from affirmatively entering into the 
contract in the first place. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in entering into the 
contract with Urbanik where he knew he was employed by Millard County and that 
Millard County had contracted with Urbanik to prepare the waste management plan. 
Argument II: The State had no burden to prove that Pearson held guilty or 
scienter knowledge or intent when he entered into the contract with Urbanik, and failed to 
file the required sworn statement and disclose his private contract in public meeting. 
Argument III: Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 
228 and related authority argued by Pearson in his Brief, that Pearson had to have had 
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actual knowledge of the requirements of Section 17-16a-5 has no application in this case. 
Argument IV: The Jury was properly instructed concerning mens rea in this 
case, where they were instructed according to the definitions found in the Utah Criminal 
Code, Section 76-2-103(1) & (2) concerning both intentional conduct and knowing 
conduct, and that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and 
intentionally entered into the contract with Urbanik without filing the required sworn 
statement and making the disclosure in public meeting. 
Argument V: Pearson was correctly convicted of theft of services where he used 
county secretaries and equipment to perform work required of him personally under his 
private agreement with Urbanik and used his position as County Administrator to have a 
county employee weigh truck loads of waste to generate information, and caused the cost 
of doing so to be paid for by the county where the same was required of him personally 
under the contract with Urbanik. 
Argument VI: Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the 
law, it could have found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement 
and make a disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before 
he entered into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally 
failed to do so. 
ARGUMENTS 
8 
Argument I 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-16a-5 prohibits both an act and an omission. 
First, an act, in that it prohibits a public official from contracting with another who in 
turn is contracting with the official's employer and second, an omission, if he does not 
timely file his required sworn statement and make his disclosure in open meeting. 
Pearson's ignorance of this law is no excuse. Pearson's position that a violation of this 
Section, as charged in Count II of the Information, requires a mens rea or a mental 
element is correct. But the law does not require that the State prove that he knew the 
requirements of the Section charged, or put another way the law does not require that he 
in fact be aware of the requirements of the Section and that he then violate the proscribed 
conduct. The definition of knowing and intentional conduct makes this aspect of the law 
very clear. U.C.A. Section 76-2-103(1) and (2) states; 
"A person engages in conduct": 
"(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of this conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result." 
"(2)" Knowingly or with knowledge, with respect to 
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when 
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances..." 
The "conduct" in this case was not just failing to file the sworn statement and 
make the disclosure in public meeting, it included being the Millard County 
Administrator, a public officer, and knowingly and intentionally entering into the private 
9 
contract with Urbanick to help him prepare the waste management plan, with knowledge 
that Urbanik had contracted with Millard County to prepare the Plan for Millard County, 
Pearson's employer. All the mens rea element of the offense required, was that Pearson 
knowingly and intentionally entered into the conduct. Pearson's attempt to isolate out the 
requirement to make the disclosures, as the only prohibited act is not correct. Pearson was 
prohibited from affirmatively entering into the contract in the first place. Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally in entering into the contract with Urbanik where he knew he 
was employed by Millard County and that Millard County had contracted with Urbanik to 
prepare the waste management plan. 
Ignorance of the law is no excuse.4 U.C.A. Section 76-2-304 provides: 
"§ 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law 
. . . .(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or 
meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor 
reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, 
and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
421 Am Jurisprudence 2d, criminal Law Section 142. See Skeen vs. Craig, 86 P. 487, 
where the Supreme Court of Utah said long ago that "Now, there is no principle of law more 
closely adhered to and followed than the rule that every person is presumed to know the law;. ." 
And also see People vs. Monk, 28 P. 115 where the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah said 
". . . [F]or in general every person is presumed to know the law of the country in which he lives. 
' And in no case can one enter a court of justice, to which he has been summoned in either a civil 
or criminal proceeding, with the sole and naked defense that when he did the thing complained of 
he did not know of the existence of the law which he violated,' nor that he believed the law to be 
different from what it really was, nor even if he was misled by the advice of counsel. 1 Bish. Crim. 
Law Section 209; Com. V. Bagley, 7 Pick. 281. Indeed, the strongest authorities cited by the 
learned counsel hold that, where the law which has been infringed upon was settled and plain, this 
maxim may be applied with vigor . . . " 
10 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an administrative 
agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an 
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in 
question...." 
Even if Pearson did not know about the requirement to file a sworn statement and 
disclose his intent to contract with Urbanik, his ignorance of the law is not a defense 
unless he can meet the provisos of the above Section. Pearson points to no reliance on 
an official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an 
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in 
question; or a written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of 
record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question. NONE EXIST, the law in question does not designate anyone to issue 
such a written statement, so there is none, nor is there a court opinion saying that 
Pearson did not have to file the sworn statement and make the disclosure or that he had to 
have had actual knowledge of the requirement before he could violate the Section. 
Therefore Pearson's argument that his ignorance is an excuse is wrong, and his 
ignorance, if it did exist, is no excuse. The fact that he acted knowingly and intentionally 
in entering into the contract with Urbanik under the circumstances known to him means 
he was and is guilty of Count II as determined by the Jury. 
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ARGUMENT II 
Pearson argues in his Brief that the State had to prove that he had been advised 
about the requirement of Section 17-16a-5 or that he in fact knew about the requirement 
and with the knowledge he deliberately [knowingly and intentionally] failed to comply. 
This argument is the same as saying the State had to prove he had guilty or scienter 
knowledge or intent in failing to comply with the Section. The State did not need to 
prove that Pearson acted with bad or scienter intent. In State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
Larsen tried to argue that scienter was required to be proven in his case where he was 
charged with violating the Utah securities laws. His criminal acts included his failure to 
inform investors of material information related to the company. Like Pearson in this 
subject case, Larsen argued that because the statute in question required that he act 
"willfully" which has the same meaning as "intentionally95, the State needed to prove that 
he acted with scienter intent. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and said; 
"In determining whether we can, or should, give 'willftdly' 
such a construction, we first look to the statutory definition of 
'willful'. The legislature has indicated that a person acts 
willfully when it is his or her 'desire to engage in the conduct 
that causes[s] the result.' Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-103. 
Nothing in this definition requires scienter. Moreover, a brief 
survey of the Code confirms that the Utah legislature knows 
how to require scienter, if it so desires, by including specific 
language to that effect. See, e.g. id. Sections 23-20-27, 41-
la-1319, 76-6-506.2, 76-10-706 & -1006." 
The Supreme Court in Larsen held that the mens rea requirement of "willful" conduct did 
5See U.C.A. Section 76-2-103(1). 
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not mean scienter intent, and neither should this Court find that the mens rea requirement 
of an intentional act in this subject case inherently includes a requirement of scienter 
intent as argued by Pearson. 
Argument IIL 
Pearson argues that Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 
228, is authority for his novel argument, that he had to have had knowledge of the 
requirement to file a sworn statement and make a public disclosure. He also cites 
questionable authority from a horn book of the law and a law school text book6 that is in 
turn based primarily on Lambert vs. California. Whatever the holding was in Lambert, 
the case is clearly distinguishable from this case. In Lambert the law in question 
required that the defendant register as a felon while she resided in Los Angeles which she 
was charged with failing to do. It was a passive registration law that did not require any 
mental element or mens rea. The Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Douglas 
said; 
". . . [W]e deal here with conduct that is wholly passive-mere 
failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the 
failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to 
the consequences of his deed, [citations omitted]. . . The rule 
that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse' [citations 
omitted]is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the 
powers of local government, the police power is 'one of the 
least limitable.'[citations omitted]. On the other hand, due 
6LaFave, Criminal Law and Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law 
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process places some limits on its exercise. Engrained in our 
concept of due process is the requirement of notice . . . [T]he 
principle is . . . appropriate where a person, wholly passive 
and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of 
justice for condemnation in a criminal case " 
Lambert is distinguishable because in this subject case, the prohibition in Section 
17-16a-5 is not wholly passive as argued above. It prohibits a public official from 
intentionally and knowingly entering into a contract with some person who in turn is 
doing business with his employer without filing a sworn statement and disclosing his 
private contract at a public meeting. This is totally different from a passive requirement 
that one register as a felon. Lambert is often quoted, but seldom followed in any case. 
The narrow holding and authority of Lambert has been recognized by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in State vs. Moore, 782 P.2d 497. The Court said; 
" . . . [PJunishment of a person for a crime when 
ignorant of the facts making it so does not involve a denial of 
due process. The narrow exception to this rule is found 
where legistation criminalized 'wholly passive' conduct by a 
person who is 'unaware of any wrongdoing.'" 
Pearson's crime or conduct fits within the class of crimes briefly mentioned by 
Justice Douglas in the above quotation, where he said, speaking of a "wholly passive" 
type of crime, "It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under 
circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed, [citations 
omitted]..." In this subject case, Pearson was in a special class of persons who should 
have known. He was as appointed high-level public official in Millard County, and had 
14 
been so for many years. He knew he was the County Administrator, and he knew he was 
in charge of the County waste collection and landfill program. He knew the state was 
requiring the Counties to prepare a solid wast management plan. He knew the state was 
sending down money to do so. He knew Urbanik had contracted to prepare the plan to 
satisfy the guidelines and requirements of the state for Millard County. He knew he was 
contracting with Urbanik to do part of the work and get half of the money privately. 
Pearson should have been alerted, in the words of Justice Douglas, to the requirement of 
the Section in the County Officers and Employees Disclosure Act. He was not just a 
member of the public required by law to satisfy a wholly passive registration requirement. 
As a Public Officer, in the position he was he held in Millard County, he had more of a 
duty to know the law as it pertained to his public position and his private related 
endeavor. 
Argument IV 
The Jury in this case was properly instructed in regards to the mens rea 
requirements. As pointed out in Pearson's Brief, the Mens rea of Section 17-16a-5 
charged in Count II is not set out in the section but rather in a general catchall section in 
the Chapter, Section 17-16a-10 which says;"... any person who knowingly and 
intentionally violates this part is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor...." In Instruction No. 
7, Record page 535 the court instructed the Jury concerning the elements of Count II and 
that one of the elements which needed to be found by the Jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
was that Pearson; 
15 
"(4) did knowingly and intentionally receive or agree to receive compensation for 
assisting Joe Urbanick, dba Stansbury Design Associates, in a transaction, to wit-
preparation of a solid wast management plan involving Millard County, (5) without filing 
a sworn statement giving the information required by Utah Code Annotated Section 17-
16a-5(2-3), and without disclosing the same to the Millard County Commission in open 
meeting" 
At Instruction No. 19 at Record page 528 the court instructed the Jury that "A 
person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result." A similar instruction was given defining "knowingly" at Instruction 
No. 15 at Record page 527. These two instructions mirror the language of those terms 
found in the Criminal Code at Section 76-2-103 quoted above. 
Instructions defining "intentional" or "intentionally" that mirror the code's 
definitions are sufficient instructions in a criminal case where they are necessary. 
Again, the case of State vs. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 applicable authority for this argument, 
particularly where Larsen was making very similar arguments about scienter intent as 
does Pearson in this case. 
Argument V 
Count III of the Information charged Pearson with "theft of services", a Class B 
misdemeanor. "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
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over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof [ Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-6-404] "A person commits theft if, having control over the 
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the 
services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to 
them. [U.C.A. Section 76-6-409(2)] Pearson's acts fit squarely within the above 
definitions of theft and theft of services. He was the Millard County Administrator, and 
the person in charge of the Delta office for Millard County. He was the supervisor of the 
Delta office and in that capacity had both Sheryl Dekker and Deb David perform 
secretarial work for him personally on the private contract he had with Urbanik.[See 
Sheryl Dekker's testimony at R. 617 page 38 and Deb David's testimony at page 60 and 
also State's ex. 35 and 54] They were both hired by the county as secretaries and clerks 
in the Delta office. They used county time and equipment to do Pearson's private work. 
Pearson was also in charge of the county landfill and collection program. As the 
one in charge he gave orders to Phil Lovell to weigh truck loads of material collected 
from dumpster sites in order to gather information required of Pearson under his private 
contract with Urbanik. Pearson then caused that the cost of doing so was paid by the 
county, rather than it being an expense to him personally in his performance of his 
contract with Urbanik. [R. 618 page 295 line 13-25 and 296, 297; State's Ex. 46] 
Pearson used his authority over services of the county for his own benefit and for the 
benefit of Urbanik in clear violation of the theft statutes quoted above. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the law, it could have 
found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement and make a 
disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before he entered 
into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally failed to do so. 
Prior to this incident, Pearson had been the Millard County Administrator for 
many years. After he first came to work, he was given more and more responsibility. [R 
617 page 7, line 15-25] During the year 1986 he was put in charge of the Millard County 
solid waste management system by authority of Ordinance 152 and that responsibility 
continued during all times relevant to this case, along with his other duties as Millard 
Comity Administrator. [See Pearson's own comments about his job and role, speaking for 
and on behalf of Millard County, [R. 618, page 71 line 5-25, and page 72 linel-15] & [ 
Ex. 47 and R. 617 page 13, 14 &25 line 16-25.] Pearson was an experienced public 
administrator, and was the person in Millard County who was the expert in such 
matters. [See R. 618 page 218] The Jury could have found that such an experienced and 
knowledgable public administrator would be aware of the requirements of U.C.A. Section 
17-16a-5 and knowingly and intentionally failed to follow the requirements. 
Pearson was reminded of the need to follow the state law in question in the very 
beginning of the State program to develop a state wide solid waste plan from county plans 
to be submitted. Keith Burnett testified that he was the program manager with the State 
Division of Community Development, in May of 1991. These were the State people who 
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divided up and sent out the $400,000.00 dollars to the counties to pay for the cost of 
preparing the county plans. [R. 618, page 92, 93, 94] Mr. Burnett was aware that Urbanik 
was contracting with Millard County to prepare the County's plan. He also talked to 
Pearson during this initial period of development about Pearson helping Urbanik prepare 
the plan for Millard County.7 This information was developed during Pearson's 
attorney's cross-examination of Mr. Burnett. [See R. 618, page 105, line 15-25 and page 
106 line 1-5.] 
At page 106 line 2, the witness testified that; "The discussion was, Mr. Pearson 
asked me if there would be a problem with him doing some subcontracting work with the 
prime contractor. I indicated that there was no problematic problem with that if all 
other requirements under state law are met" (Emphasis added) From this evidence 
alone, the Jury could have found that Pearson was put on notice of the law, was aware of 
the law, and knowingly and intentionally ignored it by not filing the required sworn 
statement and make the required disclosure in open meeting. 
November the 19th, 1991 was an important day in the evidence in this case. It 
was the day that Pearson called Urbanik about doing the solid waste management plan 
together after he had talked to Mr. Burnett on the telephone. It was a county commission 
meeting day. It was also the day that the matter was first mentioned to the county 
commission during a commission meeting. [See commission minutes dated November 19, 
7This was about November, 1991. [See R. 618, page 111 line 8-14] Urbanik pegged the 
date as about November 19, 1991. [See R. 618, page 132 line 6-19] 
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1991; Ex. 41, page 2] The commission minutes noted that discussion, about the 
"Approval of Contract with Division of Community Development Plan, Regarding Solid 
Wast Management Plan", was brought up by Robyn Pearson, the defendant herein. The 
minute entry mentions that "Approval was made of the contract with the Division of 
Community Development Plan regarding the Solid Waste Management Plan. The 
commission discussed the possibility of contracting with an engineer, who might in turn 
sub-contract with Robyn Pearson. He will work on this project on his own time. " This 
evidence told the Jury that Robyn Pearson knew that by law he needed to advise the 
commission about his agreement with Urbanik at the very outset. The clear insinuation of 
the discussion is that it was brought up and discussed by Pearson himself. He is the one 
who told the commission. There was no reason for him to mention the possibility in the 
future to the commission, except that he knew the requirements of the law. Based on this 
clear implication in the evidence before the Jury, along with the other implications 
discussed above, the Jury could have found that Pearson knew the requirements of the 
Section in question and that he knowingly and intentionally failed to do so when the time 
came for him to satisfy those requirements. The evidence before the Jury was that the 
agreement with Urbanik had been discussed between the commissioners and him on June 
22, 1992. On that date Urbanik presented himself to the County Commission talking 
about Senate Bill 255 and the need to prepare a county solid waste management plan to 
be submitted to the State. Pearson was present and took part in the discussions.[See Ex. 
42, page 4.] On the very next day Urbanik signed the agreement between himself and the 
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county, [See Ex. 18] and sent a letter to Pearson agreeing to split the money with 
him.[See Ex. 26] The agreement was then not signed by the county until July 6, 1992. 
[See Ex. 18]. On that date Pearson was present at the commission meeting where the 
agreement was reviewed and approved and the agreement was signed. [See Ex. 45 page 
3] Pearson did not make any disclosure to the commission about his agreement to receive 
half of the money, which had been previously agreed upon between him and Urbanik as 
memorialized in Urbanik's letter of June 23, 1992, Ex. 26. Based on this evidence the 
Jury could have found that Pearson deliberately failed to disclose his agreement with 
Urbanik and file the required sworn statement. 
CONCLUSION 
Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Pearson's ignorance of this law is no excuse. 
Pearson's attempt to isolate out the requirement to file the sworn statement and make the 
disclosures, as the only prohibited conduct by Section 17-16a-5 of the Utah Code is not 
correct. Pearson was prohibited from affirmatively entering into the contract in the first 
place. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in entering into the contract with 
Urbanik where he knew he was employed by Millard County and that Millard County 
had contracted with Urbanik to prepare the waste management plan. The State had no 
burden to prove that Pearson held bad or scienter intent when he entered into the contract 
with Urbanik, failed to file the required sworn statement and disclose his private contract 
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in public meeting. Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 
and related authority argued by Pearson in his Brief, that Pearson had to have had actual 
knowledge of the requirements of Section 17-16a-5 has no application in this case. The 
Jury was properly instructed concerning mens rea in this case, where they were instructed 
according to the definitions found in the Utah Criminal Code, Section 76-2-103(1) & (2) 
concerning both intentional conduct and knowing conduct, and that the State had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally entered into the contract 
with Urbanik without filing the required sworn statement and making the disclosure in 
public meeting. 
Pearson was correctly convicted of theft of services where he used county 
secretaries and equipment to perform work required of him personally under his private 
agreement with Urbanik and used his position as County Administrator to have a county 
employee weigh truck loads of waste to generate information, and caused the cost of 
doing so to be paid for by the county where the same was required of him personally 
under the contract with Urbanik. 
Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the law, it could have 
found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement and make a 
disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before he entered 
into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally failed to do so. 
Dated this 5"Day of peAh~ 
Dexter L Anderson 
Chief Millard County Deputy Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, herby certify that I have served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee on 
the following persons, by mailing the same United States mail, postage prepaid, on the 
S Day of ^cXr , 1999, to the following persons. 
Kenneth R. Brown 
Attorney for Appellant 
210 Clift Building 
10 West 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM A 
-ZS 
Norman H Bangerter 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
324 South State Suite 300 Box 7 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
801 538-8722 
92 2072 
Contract # 
Applicant Millard County 
Project solid waste plans 
Org Code 7970 - HWASTE 
CONTRACT 
PERMANENT COMMUNITY IMPACT FUND BOARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
Department of Cn—imity and Economic Development 
Division of Community Development Services 
This contract is entered into by and between the State of Utah, Department 
of Community & Economic Development, Division of Community Development 
Services, Permanent Community Impact Fund Board (hereinafter the "BOARD") and 
HTUMD (WronT, TTTAff 
an applicant under the provisions contained in Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah 
Code, (hereinafter the "CONTRACTOR"). Pursuant to the provisions of that 
Statute, and the powers and functions of the Permanent Community Impact Fund 
Board, the BOARD hereby finds and determines, based upon the formal 
application of the CONTRACTOR, the evidence provided by the CONTRACTOR to the 
BOARD and its staff, and information developed by the BOARD in its own 
investigations and. at the hearings on the application of the CONTRACTOR, the 
following, that: 
1. Pursuant to Section 17-15-23, and Section 63-52-3(6), Utah Code 
Unannotated (1990), the CONTRACTOR: 
A. Is a county or entity created or designated by a county for the 
purpose of preparing a county solid waste management plan; 
B. That the monies sought by the CONTRACTOR are for the preparation 
of a county solid waste management plan; 
C. That the CONTRACTOR meets and complies with the criteria set by 
Statute and by the BOARD for the providing of money to 
applicants. 
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2. Pursuant to Section 63-52-3(6) Utah Code Unannotated (1990), the 
BOARD has reviewed the usages of the funds allocated to the 
CONTRACTOR, and that the usages are within the proper purposes 
Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah Code, and the allocation of money to the 
CONTRACTOR is within the proper prioritization of the BOARD and meets 
all the criteria and requirements of the rules and statutes involved. 
Based upon these findings, the BOARD is authorized and empowered to, and 
does hereby, enter into the following agreement with the CONTRACTOR. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. The BOARD shall provide the CONTRACTOR the amount of & 11,985.00 
(CONTRACT AMOUNT) as described in Exhibit-1, Grant Provisions. 
2. The CONTRACTOR shall complete the Project described in Exhibit-2, 
Work Description, within the CONTRACT PERIOD listed in Exhibit-11 
Grant Provisions. 
3. The CONTRACTOR shall comply with the grant provisions identified in 
Exhibit-1, Grant Provisions. 
4. Payment by the BOARD is subject to availability of state funds. 
5. The CONTRACTOR shall notify the BOARD in writing of any proposed 
modification the Project which alters Exhibit-1f Work Description 
and/or amount to ten percent (10.0%) or more of the total CONTRACT 
AMOUNT. If such notification is not received, the BOARD reserves the 
right to disallow the cost of the proposed modification and to 
request return of its funds. This in no way should be construed so 
as to allow any surplus funds to be expended on items not related to 
the specifically approved project. 
6. All unused funds must be returned to the BOARD. Funds returned as 
surplus to the BOARD shall be applied as prepayment of a contract's 
outstanding loan principle• However, if the BOARD has given grant 
funds to the project, the returned funds shall be applied as a 
reduction of that grant. 
7. The CONTRACTOR shall maintain, available for audit and inspection, 
records of expenditures relating to this contract until all audits 
initiated by State auditors are completed, or for a period of four 
(4) years after termination of this contract, whichever is longer. 
8. The CONTRACTOR shall comply with all laws which normally govern its 
affairs in regard to contracts, fiscal procedure, and fair bidding 
procedures. 
9. If work on the project has not commenced within 90 days after having 
received final approval, then this contract may be cancelled by 
written notice from the BOARD to the CONTRACTOR. No work completed 
after receipt of the notice shall be reimbursable. The project must 
be completed within the specified contract period. 
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10. The CONTRACTOR shall indemnify and hold harmless the State of Utah, 
the Department of Community & Economic Development, the Division of 
Community Development Services, the Permanent Community Impact Fund 
Board and their officers, agents, and employees from and against any 
and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and claims, including claims 
for personal injury or death, damages to personal property and liens 
of workmen and materialmen, howsoever caused, resulting directly or 
indirectly from the performance of this agreement by the CONTRACTOR, 
including attorneys fees and costs in the investigation or defense of 
any claim, whether or not the claim has merit. 
11. The CONTRACTOR is an independent contractor, and, as such, shall have 
no authorization, express or implied, to bind the State of Utah, the 
Department of Community & Economic Development, the Division of 
Community Development Services, or the Permanent Community Impact 
Fund Board to any agreement, settlement, liability, or understanding 
whatsoever, nor to perform any acts as agent for the State of Utah, 
except as herein expressly set forth. 
12. CONTRACTOR expenditures under this contract determined by audit to be 
ineligible for reimbursement because they were not authorized by the 
terms and conditions of the contract, or that are inadequately 
documented, and for which payment has been made to the CONTRACTOR, 
will be immediately refunded to the BOARD by the CONTRACTOR. The 
CONTRACTOR further agrees that the BOARD shall have the right to 
withhold any or all subsequent payments under this or other contracts 
to CONTRACTOR until recoupment of overpayment is made. 
13. This contract may be altered, modified, or supplemented only by 
written amendment, executed by the parties hereto, and attached to 
the original signed copy of this agreement. No claim for services 
furnished by the CONTRACTOR, not specifically authorized by this 
Agreement will be allowed by the BOARD. 
14. If it is determined that in any manner the loan or grant was 
improperly made or entered into, or if the monies are or were used 
improperly or contrary to the terms of this agreement, the CONTRACTOR 
shall pay to the BOARD the amount of all monies and benefits received 
by the CONTRACTOR by and through the BOARD. 
zs 
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EXECUTION 
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority contained in Chapter 15, Title 17 
and Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah Code Unannotated (1990). the parties hereto 
mutually agree to perform this agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties 
the lQ- dav of V LM.r.nU-t^ 
hereto have executed this agreement on 
, 19 c(\ . This contract will take 
effect upon approval as evidenced by the appropriate signatures. 
CONTRACTOR STATE 
MTTTARn ranNTT. UTAH 
BY; XM t 
(signature) 
JER'E SRINKERHQFF. CHAIRMAN 
APPROVED - DIVISION OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 
Keith J^BJbumett 
Permanent Community Impact 
Fund Board 
Olene^STWalker, Director 
Community Development 
WITNESS 
Bv 
I (signature) 
MARLENE WHICKER. COUNTY CLERK 
MILLARD COUNTY 
60 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FILLMORE. UTAH 84631 
APPROVED - DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY 
fc ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Sandra Z. UaegUr 0K 
DCED Budget Office 
APPROVED/,- Availability of Funds 
APPROVED - DIVISION OF FINANCE 
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JURAT 
COUNTIES 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF MILLARD ) 
On the \9 ' day of V ^KVnU&\^ 1991, personally appeared before me 
JER'E BRINKERHOFF and MARLENE WHICKER
 f 
who being by me duly sworn did say that they are the 
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and COUNTY CLERK . 
respectively, of MILLARD COUNTY . a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah, and that the attached instrument was signed in behalf of said County by 
authority of a motion of its Board of County Commissioners passed on the 
f? ' day of V \HXnJMA~ , 1991 and said persons acknowledged 
to me that said County executed the same. 
"7 JM?n*.<T9ut?iMu &ftojfy litUu&/ d&Jl 
Notary Public, residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
324 South State Suite 500 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
801)538-8722 
AMENDMENT TO CONTRACT # 92-2072 
TO BE ATTACHED TO AND MADE PART of the above numbered Contract By and between the 
Department of Community and Economic Development, Division of Community Development Services, 
Permanent Community Impact Fund Board, and MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH. 
The TERMINATION DATE and the WORK DESCRIPTION are amended as shown on the attached page. 
ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONSITIONS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT REMAIN THE SAME. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF, the parties sign and cause this amendment to be effective 
OCTOBER 1. 1992. 
CONTRACTOR 
MILLARD COUNTY. UTAH 
(signature) 
JER'E BRINKERHOFF. CHAIRMAN 
MILLARD COUNTY COMMISSION 
WTTNESS 
By: 9 ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ' Z ^ L f e ^ ^ 
(signature) 
MARLENE WHICKER. COUNTY CLERK 
MILLARD COUNTY 
60 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FILLMORE. UTAH 84631 
STATE 
APPROVED - DIVISION OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 
By: 
Keith J Buniett 
PermanenrCommunity Impact 
Fund Board 
A. Barclay Ga^ chfsr 
DCED Deputy Executive Director 
Sandra Z. (Naegle 
DCED Financial Manager 
APPROVED - DIVISION OF FINANCE 
^Director 
/ 
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CONTRACT AMENDMENT 
First amendment to CONTRACT # 92-2072 
I. TERMINANTION DATE 
Termination date of this contract is extended to MARCH 31. 1994 
U. WORK DESCRD7TCON 
On or before June 1, 1993, the CONTRACTOR shall submit a county solid waste management 
plan the the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
(SHWCB) for review and acceptance of said plan. 
At a minimum said plan shall contain the submissions called for in SHWCB's Administrative 
Rule R315-30Z, "County Solid Waste Planning". 
3 2_ 
Michael O. Leavitt 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
324 South State Suite 500 
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 7910 
(801)538-8722 FAX (801)538 8888 
October 6, 1992 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRS & COUNTY CLERKS 
FROM: PERMANENT COMMUNITY IMPACT FUND BOARD 
SUBJECT: AMENDMENT TO SOLID WASTE PLANNING CONTRACTS 
Enclosed are four copies of an amendment for your contract with the PCIFB for the development 
of a county solid waste management plan. This amendment changes the submission date of the plan to 
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) from the original December 1, 1992 to June 1, 1993. 
The amendment also specifies the plan is to be in conformance with the formally adopted administrative 
rules of DEQ covering county solid waste management plans. 
The following instructions are provided as assistance. 
1. All four copies must be signed and returned. You will be sent a fully executed copy of 
the amendment for your files. 
2. The CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION must sign for the county on the 
"BY" line on page 1. The COUNTY CLERK must sign as the "WITNESS" on page 1. 
Your timely assistance on this matter will be appreciated, 
concerning the contract, please contact this office at 538-8725. 
If you require additional assistance 
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EXHIBIT-1 
GRANT PROVISIONS 
92 2072 
I. COST SHARING 
A. ESTIMATED TOTAL PROJECT COST * 11.985.00 
B. PROGRAM REVENUES 
Federal Funds 
Local Funds 
PCIB Funds 
Other Funds 
(list by source) 
Total Revenues 
II. PAYMENTS 
1. CONTRACTOR shall be provided a stun of A 11.985.00 (Contract Aaotmt) on 
the following schedule: 
a. Ninety percent (90.OX) of the Contract Amount, a sum not more than 
it 10.785.00. shall be forwarded to CONTRACTOR upon execution of this 
contract and submission by CONTRACTOR of a signed Request for Funds. 
b. Ten percent (10.0%) of the Contract Amount, a sum not more than 
i 1.200.00. shall be forwarded to CONTRACTOR upon acceptance of the 
county solid waste plan by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Committee and submission by CONTRACTOR of a signed Request for Funds. 
$ 
* 
$ 
* , 
$ _ . 
* 
$ _ 
0.00 
0.00 
11.985.00 
l.U985tQQ 
III. TERMINATION DATE 
1. This Contract shall expire JUNE 301 1993 
-6-
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EXHIBIT-2 
WORK DESCRIPTION 
On or before December 1, 1992, the CONTRACTOR shall submit a county solid 
waste management plan to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Control Board (SHWCB) for its acceptance. At a minimum 
this plan shall contain the submissions called for in the "Draft Guidelines 
for County Solid Waste Management Plans" issued by SHWCB in July 1991. 
In compliance with Section 63-46af UCA, SHWCB is required to formally 
adopt the "Draft Guidelines" as an administrative rule. Should substantial 
modifications to the "Draft Guidelines" result from the administrative rule 
making process, the BOARD shall issued such modifications as amendments to 
this contract* 
Js-
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P R O F E S S I O I A L S E R V I C E S A G R E E N E K T 
S T A I S B O R Y D E S I G N A S S O C I A T E S 
.Mil lard County CorporarJjQi] / h e r e i n a f t e r CLIENT, a 
t^Hy pni i i - i r ggXE8XX££&H/ does hereby a u t h o r i z e STANSBDRY 
DESIGN ASSOCIATES, h e r e i n a f t e r CONSULTANT, t o p rov ide the s e r v i c e s s e t fo r th 
below, s u b j e c t t o t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s s e t f o r t h below and on the r eve r se 
s ide t h e r e o f . 
A. Client Information 
Client Name: Millard County Corporation 
Representative: Robyn Pearson, Administrator 
Address: 71 South 200 West, Box 854 
Delta, Utah 84624 
Phone: 864-2068 Client P.O. #: n/a 
Owner of Property Involved: n/a Credit Ref.: n/a 
B. Project Description (Attach additional sheets if reqd.) 
Project Name/Location: Millard County Solid Waste Management Plan, 
Millard County, Utah. 
Description of CONSULTANT'S Services: Provide solid waste management 
planning services to comply with the requirements of S.B.-255, (Utah 
Solid Waste Management Act) The scope of services is based upon the 
Guidelines for County Solid Waste Management Plans and rules adopted 
by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Board for such plans. 
C. Compensation 
1. Basis (Check and complete (1). 
Hourly Fee & Reimbursable Expense 
Lump Sum + Fixed Fee with Progress Payments 
v Fixed Fee $11,983.00 
Other (Attach additional sheet-specify) 
2. CLIENT shall pay a retainage fee of $ n/a , which fee 
shall be paid in full prior to commencement of the work 
herein contemplated. Said fee shall be applied to 
CLIENT'S final payment for the services provided 
hereunder. 
D. Consultant shall commence services upon CLIENT'S execution of the 
Agreement. Services shall be completed within the time interval 
specified above. 
E. Having read, understood and agreed to the foregoing, and the terms 
and conditions set forth on the reverse side hereof and hereby 
incorporated into and made a part of this agreement, CLIENT and 
CONSULTANT, by and through their authorized representatives, have 
subscribed their names hereon effective the date set forth above. 
CLIENT STANSmjRY DESIGN ASSOCIATES 
Joseph A. Urbanik 
P r i n c i p a l 
-y-L-r^ (ojzz fcz. 
ARTICLE i. DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Hourly Fee: 
The hourly f e e for each employee engaged on the Project , as a t tached and 
referenced as Exhibit A, shall be t h e so le bas is of compensation for employees 
of Stansbury Design Assoc ia te s unless otherwise author ized by t h e Client , plus 
reimbursable expenses , as f o l l o w s 
1.2 Reimbursable Expenses: 
Expenditures made by Consultant, i t s employees or i t s c o n s u l t a n t s in the 
i n t e r e s t of t h e Project . Reimbursable Expenses inc lude but are not l i m i t e d to: 
A. Expense of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s u b s i s t e n c e and lodging when t r a v e l i n g in 
connect ion w i th t h e projec t . 
B, Expense of long d i s t a n c e or t o l l te lephone c a l l s , te legrams, messenger s e r v i c e , 
f i e l d o f f i c e expense, and f e e s paid f o r securing approval of a u t h o r i t i e s having 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e Project . 
C Expense of a l l reproduct ions , postage and handling of drawings, 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , r epor t s or o ther Project re la ted ins truments of s e r v i c e of the 
Consultant. 
D. Expense of computer t ime inc luding charges for p r o p r i e t a r y programs. 
E. Expense of preparing p e r s p e c t i v e s , renderings or models. 
ARTICLE 2. COMPENSATION 
2J. Progress Payments: 
Client w i l l be i n v o i c e d a t the end o f the f i r s t ca lendar month fol lowing the 
e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f t h i s agreement and a t the end of each month t h e r e a f t e r . Such 
i n v o i c e s sha l l r e f l e c t b i l l i n g for work performed by Consultant during t h e month 
invoiced . Payment on an i n v o i c e i s due upon r e c e i p t of t h e i n v o i c e by Client . 
In t h e e v e n t o f a d i s p u t e regarding an invo ice , Cl ient sha l l pay a l l undisputed 
amounts a s per t h i s Ar t i c l e . 
2.2 Late Payment: 
Consultant may a s s e s s a carrying charge of 1.5 percent per month on progress 
payments not made wi th in (30) days o f the date of i n v o i c e , which charge Client 
warrants wi l l be paid upon demand. Consultant may, i n i t s s o l e d i s c r e t i o n and 
wi thout n o t i c e , suspend or t erminate i t s s e r v i c e s under t h i s agreement should 
Client not s a t i s f y any amount i n v o i c e d within f o r t y - f i v e (45) days of the d a t e 
of i n v o i c e . Consultant fur ther r e s e r v e s t h e r ight t o withhold from Client any 
instruments o f Consultants s e r v i c e , or c o p i e s thereof , developed for Client 
under t h i s agreement pending payment on Cl ients o u t s t a n d i n g indebtedness . 
ARTICLE 3. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
3.1 Applicable Law: 
This agreement shall be interpreted and enforced according to the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
3.2 Assignment: Subcontracting: 
Neither Cl ient or Consultant shall ass ign i t s i n t e r e s t in t h i s agreement without 
the w r i t t e n consent of the other , except tha t Consultant may subcontract any 
port ion of i t s s e r v i c e s without such consent. 
3.3 Force Majeure: 
Any delay or d e f a u l t in the performance of any obi i ga t ion of e i t h e r party under 
t h i s agreement resu l t ing from any cause(s) beyond sa id party's reasonable 
control , shal l not be deemed a breach of t h i s agreement. The occurrence of any 
such e v e n t shal l suspend the o b l i g a t i o n s of said party as long as performance 
is delayed or prevented hereby. 
At torneys Fees: 
In the event of defaul t hereunder, the d e f a u l t i n g party agrees to p**y all c o s t s 
incurred by the non-default ing party in enforc ing t h i s agreement, including 
reasonable a t torney ' s fees, whether incurred through i n i t i a t i o n of legal 
proceedings or otherwise . 
S e v e r a b i l i t y Waiver: 
In t h e event any provision(s) of t h i s agreement shal l be held t o be inva l id or 
unenforceable, t h e remaining prov i s ions sha l l remain va l id and binding upon the 
p a r t i e s . One or more waiver of any term, c o n d i t i o n or o ther p r o v i s i o n of t h i s 
agreement by e i t h e r party shal l not be cons trued as a waiver of a subsequent 
breach of t h e same or any other prov i s ion . 
Amendments: Mergertek 
This agreement may be amended on by w r i t t e n instrument express ly referring 
h e r e t o and duly s igned by the p a r t i e s . This agreement c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e n t i r e 
and i n t e g r a t e d agreement between t h e p a r t i e s here to and supersedes a l l pr ior 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , representat ions and/or agreements, w r i t t e n or ora l . 
ARTICLE 4. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
Addit ional Services: 
S e r v i c e s not express ly or i m p l i c i t l y inc luded wi th those here in s p e c i f i e d , as 
determined by Consultant, are not covered by t h i s agreement. Such s e r v i c e s may 
be provided only upon execut ion of amendment in compliance with t h i s 
agreement. 
Termination: 
This agreement may be terminated by e i t h e r par ty upon seven (7) days w r i t t e n 
n o t i c e should t h e o ther party f a i l s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o perform i n accordance wi th 
t h i s agreement thorough no f a u l t of t h e par ty i n i t i a t i n g the terminat ion . This 
agreement may be terminated by Client upon a l e a s t seven (7) days w r i t t e n n o t i c e 
t o t h e Consultant in t h e event t h a t t h e Project i s permanently abandoned. If 
t h i s agreement i s terminated through no f a u l t of t h e Consultant , Client shal l 
pay Consultant for s e r v i c e s performed and Reimbursable Expenses incurred in 
accordance wi th t h i s agreement and, upon reques t , a Termination Adjustment 
equa l l ing f i f t e e n percent (15%) of t h e e s t i m a t e d f e e remaining t o be earned a t 
t h e t i m e of terminat ion t o account for Consultant's reschedul ing adjustments, 
reassignment of personnel and re lated c o s t s incurred due t o terminat ion . 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
Consultant and Client shall each des igna te i n w r i t i n g a person(s) authorized t o 
a c t a s t h e i r Representat ive^) . Said R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s shal l r e c e i v e and examine 
documents submit ted by the o ther party and sha l l i n t e r p r e t and def ine t h e i r 
firm's p o l i c i e s and render dec i s ions and a u t h o r i z a t i o n s promptly t o prevent 
unreasonable delay i n t h e progress of t h e Project . Said R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s shal l 
s e r v e as so l e intermediar ies between Consultant and Client . 
C l i en t Information: 
Consultant shal l have the r ight t o rely on any and a l l information suppl ied t o 
Consultant by or through Client, and shal l not have a duty t o ver i fy the 
accuracy of such information unless o therwise agreed herein. Cl ient shall hold 
harmless, indemnify and defend Consultant as t o any claims re la ted , d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y , t o Consultants use of or re l iance upon any such information. 
Limitat ion of Liabi l i ty : 
Cl ient l i m i t s Consultant's l i a b i l i t y t o Cl ient and al l con trac tors or 
subcontrac tors on the Project which may a r i s e from or be due d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y t o the professional ac t s , errors and/or omissions, including 
negl igence, of Consultant, i t s agents, employees or c o n s u l t a n t s such that 
Consultants aggregate l i a b i l i t y to such p a r t i e s does not exceed Consultant's fee 
or $50,000, whichever i s greater. 
ADDENDUM C 
7«T 
Stansbury Design Associates 
128 COUNTRY CLUB TELEPHONE (801) 560-7766 
STANSBURY PARK, UTAH, 84074 (801) 882-3031 
June 23, 1992 
Millard County Corporation 
% Robyn Pearson, Administrator 
71 South 200 West 
Box 854 
Delta, Utah 84624 
Dear Robyn: 
Enclosed a partial billing and short form contract for 
services rendered on the Millard County Waste Management Plan. 
This billing is predicated on our discussion with the County 
Commission on June 22, 1992. As discussed, Stansbury Design 
Associates will contract with Millard County for the amount 
authorized to the County ($11,983) by the Community Impact Board. 
Stansbury Design Associates shall retain your services by 
means of a subcontract for contributions of effort performed on the 
project. It is anticipated that you will responsible for various 
elements of the planning process to include; site inventory data, 
waste generation data, financial documentation and public 
participation activities. As agreed, we submit that the 50% share 
of fee(s) charged to the county between yourself and our firm is 
appropriate. 
The amount requested is for 25% of $11,983.00 = $2,995.75 for 
site mapping, inventory, waste inventory and waste generation 
projections. Should you have any questions or need additional 
information, please call. 
Joseph A. Urbanik 
Enclosure: 
QO 
STANSBURY DESIGN ASSOCIATES 
June 23, 1992 
Services rendered for Millard County Waste Management Plan 
from November, 1991 through June; 1, 1992: 
25% of Lump Sum Bid of $11,983.00 $2,995.75 
Please remit to: 
Stansbury Design Associates 
128 Country Club 
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074 
<-il 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
C. Dean Larsen, Defendant and Petitioner 
No. 920114 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
865 P.2d 1355, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
December 17, 1993, Filed 
Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
COUNSEL 
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., David B. Thompson, Asst. Attfy Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Larry R. Keller, John T. Nielsen, David L. Arlington, Joel G. Momberger, Jon E. Waddoups, 
Melyssa D. Davidson, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
JUDGES 
ZIMMERMAN, Howe, Durham, Frederick, Rokich 
AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
C. Dean Larsen petitioned for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of a Utah Court of Appeals 
decision upholding the district court's rulings on two issues relating to his conviction on eighteen 
counts of criminal securities fraud. Larsen contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury that the intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate is an element of a criminal violation of 
sections 1(2) and 21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), -21. 
Larsen also complains that the trial court erroneously allowed a State expert to testify as to the 
"materiality" of information that Larsen allegedly had failed to disclose to investors. We affirm his 
convictions. 
11 *? 
The facts of this case are detailed in the court of appeals1 opinion in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 488-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To summarize, Larsen was charged with, and convicted of, 
eighteen counts of securities fraud under sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 of the Code. These 
convictions arose out of his actions while president of a real estate development company in 
which others had invested. Larsen's criminal acts included his failure to inform investors of 
material information related to the company, misrepresentations of material facts regarding the 
company's financial status, and related acts of dishonesty. Larsen appealed to the court of appeals, 
which affirmed his convictions. 828 P.2d at 496. We granted certiorari to consider his claims of 
legal error. 
Larsen first asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the applicable law. 
He alleges that the trial court improperly refused to give portions of his proposed instructions 
concerning the elements of and defenses to criminal securities fraud. The omitted portions, in 
substance, would have instructed the jury that to be guilty of a criminal violation of section 
61-1-1(2), Larsen must have acted with the specific intent to defraud and that a representation 
made "in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of securities fraud." 
The propriety of the instructions given hinges on the correct interpretation of sections 
61-1-1(2) and -21. 11 In particular, does a criminal violation of these sections require proof of an 
intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate? The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, this court first examines the plain 
language of the statute. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Section 61-1-1(2) states in 
relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any 
security, directly or indirectly to: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). T 2 This section's standards govern both civil and criminal 
liability. To ascertain the elements of a criminal violation, however, this section must be read in 
conjunction with section 61-1-21, which specifies the requisite mental state and penalties for a 
criminal violation. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Section 61-1-21 provides in pertinent part: 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter [including section 
61-1-1(2)]. . . or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter . . . shall upon 
conviction be fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 
i / ? 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (emphasis added). The plain language of section 61-1-21 requires 
that to be liable for a criminal violation of section 61-1-1(2), the defendant must have acted 
"willfully" in misstating or omitting material facts. Id. Larsen asks this court to interpret "willfully" 
as requiring "scienter," the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a rule 10b-5 case. 
In determining whether we can, or should, give "willfully" such a construction, we first look 
to the statutory definition of "willful." The legislature has indicated that a person acts willfully 
when it is his or her "desire to engage in the conduct that cause[s] the result." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-103. Nothing in this definition requires scienter. 13 Moreover, a brief survey of the Code 
confirms that the Utah legislature knows how to require scienter, if it so desires, by including 
specific language to that effect. See, e.g., id. §§ 23-20-27, 41-la-1319, 76-6-506.2, 76-10-706 & 
-1006. 
Failing to find support in the express terms of the Code, Larsen suggests that the scienter 
requirement is an "independent element" of the offense. Stated another way, although it is not 
apparent from the language of the provision, Larsen contends that we should read the scienter 
requirement into the statute. We have rejected similar attempts to engraft a judicially created 
intent requirement upon the plain language of a criminal statute. E.g., State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (Utah 1983) (holding offense of writing bad check does not require intent to defraud). 
Perhaps more on point, other states have rejected attempts to import scienter into analogous 
securities-fraud statutes. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1369, 262 Cal. Rptr. 366, 
369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Temby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1982). This court will not affix new "independent requirements" to an otherwise clear and 
constitutional statute. 
Although the language of the statute effectively disposes of the issue, Larsen asserts that this 
court should look beyond the plain language of the Utah Uniform Securities Act to the legislative 
intent. Section 61-1-27 of the Code provides that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be 
construed so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related 
federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Larsen asserts that this section was intended to 
bind state judicial interpretations of Utah's antifraud provisions to the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretations of similar federal securities provisions. Specifically, Larsen argues that the 
language similarities between section 61-1-1(2) and rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"), when viewed in light of the intent requirement embodied in section 
61-1-27, require this court to interpret Utah's antifraud provision in conformity with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Hochfelder held, inter alia, 
that "scienter," or an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, must be proved before civil liability 
can be imposed under rule 10b-5. See id. at 674; Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 
680, 692 (1980). Larsen's argument is facially legitimate and requires response. 
We first examine Hochfelder's reasoning. The issue before the Hochfelder court was 
"whether a private cause of action for damages [would] lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the 
absence of any allegation of'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. The SEC 
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promulgated rule 10b-5 14 pursuant to powers vested in it by section 10(b) 15 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Id. at 195. The Court ultimately determined that scienter is 
required because the language of section 10 (b)--the statutory authority upon which rule 10b-5 is 
grounded—implicitly limited the SEC's power to promulgate an implementing rule to one that 
required scienter. Id. at 213-14; see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690; 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law 
of Securities Regulation § 13.4, at 81 (2d ed. 1990). 
In contrast to rule 10b-5, Utah's securities fraud provision, section 61-1-1(2), does not 
operate against a background of limiting statutory authority. The interpretation we give to section 
61-1-1(2) of the Utah Code is therefore not circumscribed by the dispositive language of section 
10(b) of the 1934 Act. In that respect, section 61-1-1(2) of the Code atavistically resembles, not 
rule 10b-5, but section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which the Aaron Court declined to 
interpret as requiring scienter. 446 U.S. at 697. 16 Because of this critical difference, Hochfelder 
is not particularly helpful in interpreting Utah's analogue to rule 10b-5. T 7 
Further, even if we were to assume that rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1(2) are direct parallels, 
as Larsen suggests, he fails to recognize that the Utah legislature has not required the courts to 
interpret the Utah Uniform Securities Act in lockstep with federal decisions. Section 61-1-27, on 
which Larsen relies for his lockstep mandate, seems to make uniformity with other states more 
important than uniformity with interpretations of analogous federal statutes. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-27. Section 61-1-27 provides that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be so construed as 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to 
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
legislation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis added). Although the meaning of "coordinate" 
as it relates to federal legislation is not entirely clear, the mandate "to make uniform" the law of 
the enacting states is unmistakable. Uniformity with a significant majority of states is achieved 
only by a "no scienter" construction of the provision. See Johnson, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 369; People 
v. Whitlow, 89 111. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, 60 111. Dec. 587 (111.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 
(1982); People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich. App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), 
appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Neb. 
1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (KM. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Cox, 17 
Wash. App. 896, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978); 
Temby, 322 N.W.2d at 526. 
As a policy argument for his position, Larsen argues that without a scienter requirement 
section 61-1-1(2) raises the specter of strict liability, or in other words, a fear that accounting 
firms and other professionals will be held liable for "good faith oversight" or failure "to discover 
and disclose a material fact." Larsen predicts that this threat of strict liability will preclude 
"responsible individuals and entities" from providing securities services in the future. This 
argument completely ignores the willfulness requirement of section 61-1-21 and misuses the term 
"strict liability." 
An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under the statute. This means that the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused "desire[d] to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. This highly culpable mental state is not 
consistent with "strict liability," as that term is traditionally used See Black's Law Dictionary 
1422 (6th ed 1990), 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 23, 123 (15th ed 1993) Further, a "no 
scienter" reading of the statute will affect only those professionals who willfully omit or misstate 
material facts This result seems to be exactly what the legislature intended If the legislature had 
wanted scienter for perceived public policy reasons, it could have included that requirement It did 
not, and we will not 18 
Larsen's second challenge is based on his claim that the trial court erred by allowing a 
securities expert for the State, Sherwood Cook, 19 to testify as to the "materiality" of 
information Larsen allegedly had omitted from securities-related documents Larsen's argument 
before this court is somewhat diffuse Nevertheless, he appears to be asserting that the trial court 
should not have admitted Cook's expert testimony on materiality under Utah Rule of Evidence 
702 because the testimony purportedly expressed the "legal conclusion" that Larsen's omissions 
violated section 61-1-1(2), the statute prohibiting material omissions or misstatements 
We first state the proper standard of review The trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard State v Span, 819 P 2d 329, 332 n 1 (Utah 1991), Dixon v Stewart, 658 
P 2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), State v Clayton, 646 P 2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), see 2 Gregory P 
Joseph & Stephen A Saltzburg, Evidence in America The Federal Rules in the States ch 51, § 
51 3, at 2 & n 4 (1987) [hereinafter Joseph and Saltzburg], accord Wade v Haynes, 663 F 2d 
778, 784 (8th Cir 1981), affd, 461 U S 30 (1983) Under this standard, we will not reverse 
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992), Shurtleffv Jay Tuft & Co , 622 P 2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980) 
In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules 701 through 
704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702 provides 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise 
Utah R Evid 702 Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of 
any expert evidence is whether, "on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact" 
State v Rimmasch, 775 P 2d 388, 398 n 8 (Utah 1989), see Dixon, 658 P 2d at 598 
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide whether the subject is within the 
knowledge or experience of the average individual Dixon, 658 P 2d at 597 It is not necessary 
that the subject of the testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly 
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be 
beyond the comprehension of each and every juror See id 
Here, we agree with the court of appeals' statement that expert testimony may be appropriate 
in "securities fraud cases because the technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of 
the average layman or a subject within the common experience and would help the jury 
understand the issues before them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492-93. In his testimony, Cook was 
expressing his opinion that some of the material that Larsen had omitted from the securities 
documents could have been important or significant to an investor. 110 We do not find that the 
trial court abused its discretion in determining that such testimony would be helpful to the jury. 
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Larsen claims that even if the subject of this testimony might have been beyond the 
experience of the average individual, Cook's testimony regarding materiality was not "helpful" 
because it transgressed into the area reserved for the jury by instructing the jury as to what legally 
constitutes material information. Larsen focuses on Cook's occasional use of the term "material" 
during his expert testimony. Specifically, Larsen argues that Cook could have given his testimony 
without using the term "material" and that by using the term, he moved from arguably admissible 
opinion evidence to an "inadmissible legal conclusion" because the statute in question is framed in 
terms of material information. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). 
In the present case, the use of the term "material" presents unique problems because it has 
two possible referents. First, in ordinary parlance materiality means "important" or "significant." 
Oxford American Dictionary 547 (1980). Used in this context, "material" signifies something that 
an individual would want to know in making an important decision. One could testify about this 
concept without using the term "material" by stating that the information allegedly omitted is 
important or significant. Presumably, such testimony, assuming it was otherwise helpful and 
admissible, would not be objectionable as expressing a legal conclusion. 
The second, and legal, usage of the term "material" comes from the Utah statute under which 
Larsen was prosecuted and from securities law in general. The law uses the term "material" in 
defining what information must legally be disclosed. Larsen's basic claim is that when Cook used 
the disputed term, the trial court was allowing him to tell the jury that the omitted information 
legally constituted material information within the meaning of the statute, and Cook was thereby 
instructing the jury that Larsen was guilty. Larsen suggests, in fact, that Cook's testimony would 
have been proper if he had used a word other than "material." 
Cook certainly should have avoided employing the specific term "material." However, his 
limited use of that word, under the circumstances, does not mandate the conclusion that he was 
improperly instructing the jury on the law. 
We think that Larsen's analysis, hanging as it does on one word that has two almost identical 
meanings, is unduly formalistic. The jury was charged with making the ultimate determination of 
whether the statements made or facts omitted by Larsen were factually material, i.e., whether they 
were likely to influence a reasonable investor. Cf. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 450 (1976) ("Issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and 
fact."). Given that "materiality" has a popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before 
the jury and that Cook's testimony, when read in context, seems to use "material" as a synonym 
for "important," we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Cook's 
testimony. 
Moreover, materiality, as it relates to the importance of the omitted information, was an 
"ultimate issue." Under Utah Rule of Evidence 704, expert testimony is not objectionable solely 
because it encompasses the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Rule 704 provides in 
pertinent part that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. 
Evid. 704. Larsen's semantic characterization of Cook's testimony as a legal conclusion does not, 
without more, move the testimony outside the scope of this ultimate-issue rule. 
Larsen correctly asserts that rule 704 does not make expert testimony admissible simply 
because it expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue. By the same token, however, rule 704 
does not make expert testimony inadmissible simply because it expresses an opinion on the 
ultimate issue, as Larsen seems to suggest. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n. 1. As one commentator 
noted, "Since the adoption of rule 704, courts have generally not hesitated to follow it and to 
permit expert testimony directly concerning the critical issue before the trier of fact." Joseph & 
Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 2; see People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 400 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that pathologist's opinion testimony indicating attack occurred in two stages is not 
improper because it embraced an ultimate issue); see also United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 
737 (2d Cir.) (holding that trial court did not abuse it discretion by admitting expert testimony on 
the reach of the concepts of "underwriter" and "materiality" in securities fraud case), cert, denied, 
96 S. Ct. 270, 271 (1975). 
The bottom line is that the question of materiality as it relates to the importance or 
significance of the omitted information is, at least on one level, a factual issue to be determined by 
the jury. Rule 704 permits Cook to express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of that 
disputed issue as long as that testimony is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. See 
Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 3. Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the 
trial court abused its discretion in permitting Cook's testimony. 112 
Finally, even if the admission of Cook's testimony couched in terms of materiality had been in 
error, Larsen has not convinced us that the error would have been harmful. The trial court 
correctly admonished the jury as to the relative roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence 
and instructed the jury to accord no unusual deference to an expert's opinions. The trial court also 
gave careful instructions regarding the legal definition and requirements of the term "material" as 
used in the statute. Taken together, these instructions substantially reduced whatever slight risk of 
confusion Cook's use of the term "material" might have engendered in the jury. Given the trial 
court's adequate instructions to the jury, we find that if any error had occurred in admitting the 
expert testimony, it would have been harmless. 
The convictions are affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
^% 
J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge 
John A. Rokich, District Judge 
Hall, Chief Justice, and Stewart, Justice, having disqualified themselves, do not participate 
herein; Frederick and Rokich, District Judges, sat. 
DISPOSITION 
The convictions are affirmed. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
T1 In this case, this court is concerned only with the proper construction of a portion of 
section 61-1-1, specifically subsection 1(2). We therefore do not address the question of whether 
subsections 1(1) and 1(3) require scienter. Cf. Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 
680, 695-702 (1980). 
t2 In 1963, the Utah legislature substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, which had 
been developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30; Uniform Securities Act, reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 289-374 
(1993). See generally Wallace R. Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of History and 
the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L. Rev. 216, 227-28 (1963). The Uniform Act contains an 
anti-fraud provision, section 101, modeled after, and with language taken from, section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and rule 10b-5, which was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Uniform Securities Act § 101, cmt. .01; Blue Sky 
Laws, at 295. The Utah legislature incorporated section 101 into the Utah Code as section 61-1-1 
without significant modification. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 with Uniform Securities Act 
§101. 
T 3 To act willfully in this context means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished 
from merely accidentally or inadvertently. Cf. United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 974 (10th 
Cir. 1987). Willful, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies a 
willingness to commit the act, which, in this case, is the misstatement or omission of a material 
fact. Willful does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure another or acquire any 
advantage. See generally State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983). 
T4 17C.F.R. §240.10b-5. 
T5U.S.C. §78j(b). 
16 Section 17(a) provides: 
i ( ^ 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means 
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the 
mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). The Supreme Court in Aaron stated "that the language of § 17(a) requires 
scienter under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 446 U.S. at 697. As we are 
dealing here only with section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah provision, which is analogous to section 
17(a)(2), we do not reach the question of a scienter requirement vel non under section 61-1-1(1) 
or-1(3). 
17 Even if Hochfelder were directly on point, the committee that promulgated the Uniform 
Securities Act has indicated that the Act, in most cases including this one, was not intended to 
bind state courts to related federal interpretations. See Uniform Securities Act § 501 cmt. 3 
(1985), reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 428 (1993). In 1985, the committee specifically 
indicated that it "did not intend that state courts be bound to follow [Hochfelder]." Id. To the 
extent that Larsen relies on a perceived mandate in the Uniform Securities Act favoring state 
adherence to federal interpretations, his analysis is lacking in support. 
T 8 Because a finding of scienter is not a prerequisite to criminal liability under section 
61-1-1(2), the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that good faith is a complete defense 
to criminal liability. Cf. In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Barnett v. United States, 594 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1979). 
T 9 Cook was introduced to the jury as a former Utah securities regulation official and the top 
securities administrator in Nevada. 
110 Cook did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that Larsen was guilty, nor did Cook testify 
that, as a matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal standard of materiality. 
T11 Unlike Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987), the present case does not 
involve expert testimony regarding legal or factual issues not before the court or jury. The Ashton 
court upheld the trial court's exclusion of an attorney's proposed testimony on the legal effect of a 
joint tenant's transfer of property. Id. at 153. In other words, the proposed testimony in Ashton 
was intended solely to explain the applicable law, which did not aid the jury in resolving the 
factual disputes. 
so 
112 We do not suggest that the trial court must allow expert testimony regarding materiality, 
especially testimony utilizing the term "material." We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing the limited testimony in this case. 
We also note that an integral element of a rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence is 
a balancing of the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989). This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is 
necessary to a determination of "helpfulness." In the present case, Larsen did not specifically 
object to the use of "material" on the ground that the probative value of the usage was 
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah 
R. Evid. 403. Larsen's objections, although citing to rule 702, addressed only the contention that 
materiality in general was not a proper subject for expert testimony. Trial counsel must state 
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Inasmuch as Larsen 
failed to assert a claim of prejudice at the trial court, that issue is not properly preserved for 
appeal. If Larsen had made such an objection, it might have merited serious consideration by the 
trial court. 
(c) 1992-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
355 US 225, 2 L ed 2d 228, 78 S Ct 240, 
reh den 355 US 937, 2 L ed 2d 419, 78 S Ct 410 
[No. 47] 
Argued April 3,1957. Restored to docket for reargument June 3, 
1957. Reargued October 16 and 17, 1957. Decided December 
16, 1957. 
SUMMARY 
The Los Angeles Municipal Code makes it a criminal offense for a person 
convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in California to be present 
in Los Angeles without registering with the police. Defendant, a resident 
of Los Angeles for over seven years, was charged with a violation of this 
registration provision, because within the period of her stay in Los Angeles 
she had been convicted of the crime of forgery, a felony under California 
law, and had not, at the time of her arrest for another offense, registered 
under the Municipal Code. At the trial she offered to prove that she had 
no actual knowledge of the registration requirement, but this offer was 
refused. She asserted that the registration provisions of the Code denied 
her due process of law. Over this objection she was found guilty and fined. 
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment. 
On her appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the municipal 
ordinance, as applied to the defendant under the circumstances described 
above, violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In an opinion by DOUGLAS, J., five members of the Court expressed the 
view that where a person did not know of the duty to register and there 
was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted 
consistently with due process. Recognizing that there is wide latitude on 
the part of the lawmakers to exclude elements of knowledge in declaring 
an offense, the majority pointed out that this was not so where the con-
duct condemned was a mere failure to register. 
FRANKFURTER, J., with the concurrence of HARLAN and WHITTAKER, 
JJ., dissented, refusing to draw a constitutional line between "feasance" 
and "nonfeasance." 
BURTON, J., also dissented, because in his view the ordinance, as applied 
to the defendant, did not violate her constitutional rights. 
52. 
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HEADNOTES 
Classified to U.S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated 
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Constitutional Law § 854 — due proc-
ess — crimes — registration of 
criminals. 
1. The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is violated by 
the provisions of the Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Code making it a criminal of-
fense for a person convicted of an 
offense punishable as a felony in Cal-
ifornia to be present in Los Angeles 
without registering with the police, as 
applied to one who had no actual 
knowledge of his duty to register and 
as to whom no showing of the prob-
ability of such knowledge yras made. 
Appeal and Error § 1298 — presump-
tions — knowledge of registrar 
tion law. 
2. On appeal from a state conviction 
for defendant's failure to register with 
the police as a convict, the United 
States Supreme Court will assume that 
the defendant had no actual knowl-
edge of the registration requirement 
where his offer to prove his lack of 
knowledge was refused by the trial 
court. 
Criminal Law § 6 — wilfulness — 
failure to register. 
8. While a vicious will is not always 
necessary to constitute a crime and 
conduct alone without regard to the 
intent of the doer is often sufficient, 
there being a wide latitude on the part 
of the lawmakers to exclude, in de-
claring an offense, elements of knowl-
edge and diligence from its definition, 
this is not so where the offense con-
sists in a mere failure to register, a 
conduct which is wholly passive and 
unlike the commission of acts or the 
failure to act under circumstances 
that should alert the doer to the con-
sequences of his deed. 
Criminal Law § 20 — ignorance of law. 
4. Ignorance of the law will not 
excuse. 
Constitutional Law §§856, 857 — 
police power — due process. 
5. While of all the powers of local 
government the police power is one of 
the least limitable, due process places 
some limits on its exercise. 
Constitutional Law §§786, 831.5 — 
due process — notice. 
6. The requirement of notice is en-
grained in the concept of due process; 
notice is sometimes essential so that 
the citizen has a chance to defend 
charges; it is required before property 
interests are disturbed, before assess-
ments are made, before penalties are 
assessed, where a penalty or forfeiture 
might be suffered for a mere failure to 
act, and is equally required wtiere a 
person, wholly passive and unaware of 
any wrongdoing, is charged with a 
criminal offense. 
[See annotation references 1, 2] 
Points from Separate Opinion 
Criminal Law §6; Statutes §82.8 — 
construction — avoiding hard-
ships. 
7. Considerations of hardship often 
lead courts to attribute to a statute 
the requirement of a certain mental 
element—some < consciousness of 
wrongdoing and knowledge of the 
law's command—as a matter of stat-
utory construction. [From separate 
opinion by Frankfurter, Harlan, and 
Whittaker, JJ.] . 
Constitutional Law §848; Criminal 
Law §78 — cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
8. A cruelly disproportionate rela-
tion between what the law requires 
ANNOTATION REFERENCES 
1. Due process requirements as to notice in condemnation proceedings, 1 L ed 2d 
in proceedings to foreclose a tax or similar 1635. 
lien on real property, 1 L ed 2d 1626. 3. Excessive penalties as denial of con-
2. Due process requirements as to notice stitutional rights, 59 L ed 608. 
r3 
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and the sanction for its disobedience 
may constitute a violation of the 
Eight Amendment as a cruel and un-
usual punishment, and, in respect to 
the states, even offend the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
[From separate opinion by Frankfur-
ter, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ.] 
[See annotation reference 3] 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
Samuel C. McMorris, of Los Angeles, California, argued the 
cause on the original argument and reargument for appellant. 
Philip E. Grey, of Los Angeles, California, argued the cause on 
the original argument and reargument for appellee. 
Clarence A. Linn, of San Francisco, California, argued the 
cause on reargument for appellee. 
Warren M. Christopher, of Los Angeles, California, argued the 
cause on reargument, as amicus curiae. 
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OPINION OF 
•[355 US 226] 
•Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
Section 52.38(a) of the Los An-
geles Municipal Code defines "con-
victed person" as follows: 
"Any person who, subsequent to 
January 1, 1921, has been or here-
after is convicted of an offense pun-
ishable as a felony in the State of 
California, or who has been or who 
is hereafter convicted of any offense 
in any place other than the State of 
California, which offense, if com-
mitted in the State of California, 
would have been punishable as a 
felony." 
Section 52.39 provides that it 
shall be unlawful for "any convicted 
person" to be or remain in Los An-
geles for a period of more than five 
days without registering; it requires 
any person having a place of abode 
outside the city to register if he 
comes into the city on five occasions 
or more during a 30-day period; and 
it prescribes the information to be 
furnished the Chief of Police on 
registering. 
Section 52.43(b) makes the fail-
ure to register a continuing offense, 
each day's failure constituting a 
separate offense. 
Appellant, arrested on suspicion 
of another offense, was charged with 
a violation of this registration law.1 
THE COURT 
The evidence showed that she had 
been at the time of her arro^t a res-
ident of Los Angeles for over seven 
years. Within that period she had 
been convicted in Los Angeles of the 
crime of forgery, an offense which 
California punishes as a felony. 
Though convicted of a crime punish-
able as a felony, she had not at the 
time of her arrest registered under 
the Municipal Code. At the trial, 
•[855 US 227] 
appellant *asserted that § 52.39 of 
the Code denies her due process of 
law and other rights under the Fed-
eral Constitution, unnecessary to 
enumerate. The trial court denied 
this objection. The case was tried to 
a jury which found appellant guilty. 
The court fined her $250 and placed 
her on probation for three years. 
Appellant, renewing her constitu-
tional objection, moved for arrest of 
judgment and a new trial. This mo-
tion was denied. On appeal the con-
stitutionality of the Code was again 
challenged. The Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court affirmed 
the judgment, holding there was no 
merit to the claim that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional. The 
case is here on appeal. 28 USC 
§1257(2). We noted probable ju-
1. For a recent comprehensive review of 
these registration laws see Note, 103 U of 
Pa L Rev 60 (1954). 
b^\ 
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risdiction, 352 US 914,1L ed 2d 121, 
77 S Ct 218, and designated amicus 
curiae to appear in support of ap-
pellant. The case having been 
argued and reargued, we 
Headnote i now hold that the regis-
tration provisions of the 
Code as sought to be applied here 
violate the Due Process requirement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The registration provision, carry-
ing criminal penalties, applies if a 
person has been convicted "of an 
offense punishable as a felony in 
the State of California" or, in case 
he has been convicted in another 
State, if the offense "would have 
been punishable as a felony" had it 
been committed in California. No 
element of willfulness is by terms 
included in the ordinance nor read 
into it by the California court as a 
condition necessary for a conviction. 
We must assume that appellant 
had no actual knowledge of the re-
quirement that she reg-
Headnote t ister under this ordi-
nance, as she offered 
proof of this defense which was re-
fused. The question is whether a 
registration act of this character 
violates due process where it is ap-
plied to a person who has no actual 
knowledge of his duty to register, 
and where no showing is made of the 
probability of such knowledge. 
•[855 US 228] 
*We do not go with Blackstone in 
saying that "a vicious will" is neces-
sary to constitute a 
Headnote s crime, 4 Bl Comm *21, 
for conduct alone with-
out regard to the intent of the doer 
is often sufficient. There is wide 
latitude in the lawmakers to de-
clare an offense and to exclude ele-
ments of knowledge and diligence 
from its definition. See Chicago, 
B. & Q. R. Co. v United States, 220 
US 559, 578, 55 L ed 582, 589, 31 S Ct 
612. But we deal here with conduct 
that is wholly passive—mere failure 
CALIFORNIA 231 
2d 228, 78 S Ct 240 
to register. It is unlike the commis-
sion of acts, or the failure to act 
under circumstances that should 
alert the doer to the consequences of 
his deed. Cf. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. 
v Minnesota, 218 US 57, 54 L ed 930, 
30 S Ct 663; United States v Balint, 
258 US 250, 66 L ed 604, 42 
5 Ct 301; United States v Dotter-
weich, 320 US 277, 284, 88 L ed 48, 
53, 64 S Ct 134. The rule that 
"ignorance of the law 
Headnote 4
 w f l l n o t excuse" (Shev-
Headnote 5 lin-Carpenter Co. v Min-
nesota, supra, (218 US p 
68)) is deep in our law, as is the 
principle that of all the powers of 
local government, the police power is 
"one of the least limitable." District 
of Columbia v Brooke, 214 US 138, 
149,53Led941,945,29SCt560. On 
the other hand, due process places 
some limits on its exercise. En-
grained in our concept of due proc-
ess is the requirement of 
Headnote 6 notice. Notice is some-
times essential so that 
the citizen has the chance to defend 
charges. Notice is required before 
property interests are disturbed, be-
fore assessments are made, before 
penalties are assessed. Notice is 
required in a myriad of situations 
where a penalty or forfeiture might 
be suffered for mere failure to act. 
Recent cases illustrating the point 
are Mullane v Central Hanover Bank 
6 Trust Co. 339 US 306, 94 L ed 
865, 70 S Ct 652; Covey v Somers, 
351 US 141, 100 L ed 1021, 76 S Ct 
724; Walker v Hutchinson, 352 US 
112, 1 L ed 2d 178, 77 S Ct 200. 
These cases involved only property 
interests in civil litigation. But the 
principle is equally appropriate 
where a person, wholly passive and 
unaware of any wrongdoing, is 
brought to the bar of justice for 
condemnation in a criminal case. 
•[355US229] 
* Registration laws are common 
and their range is wide. Cf. New 
sr 
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York ex rel. Bryant v Zimmerman, 
278 US 63,73 L ed 184,49 S Ct 61, 62 
ALR 785; United States v Harriss, 
347 US 612, 98 L ed 989, 74 S Ct 808; 
United States v Kahriger, 345 US 
22, 97 L ed 754, 73 S Ct 510. Many 
such laws are akin to licensing stat-
utes in that they pertain to the regu-
lation of business activities. But the 
present ordinance is entirely differ-
ent. Violation of its provisions is 
unaccompanied by any activity what-
ever, mere presence in the city being 
the test. Moreover, circumstances 
which might move one to inquire as to 
the necessity of registration are com-
pletely lacking. At most the ordi-
nance is but a law enforcement 
technique designed for the con-
venience of law enforcement 
agencies through which a list of the 
names and addresses of felons then 
residing in a given community is 
compiled. The disclosure is merely 
a compilation of former convictions 
already publicly recorded in the ju-
risdiction where obtained. Neverthe-
less, this appellant on first becoming 
aware of her duty to register was 
given no opportunity to comply with 
the law and avoid its penalty, even 
though her default was entirely in-
nocent. She could but suffer the 
consequences of the ordinance, name-
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom 
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice 
Whittaker join, dissenting. 
The present laws of the United 
States and of the 48 States are thick 
with provisions that command that 
some things not be done and others 
be done, although persons convicted 
under such provisions may have had 
no awareness of what the law re-
quired or that what they did was 
wrongdoing. The body of decisions 
sustaining such legislation, includ-
ing innumerable registration laws, is 
almost as voluminous as the legisla-
ly, conviction with the imposition 
of heavy criminal penalties there-
under. We believe that actual 
knowledge of the duty to register 
or proof of the probability of such 
knowledge and subsequent failure 
to comply are necessary before a 
conviction under the ordinance can 
stand. As Holmes wrote in The 
Common Law, "A law which pun-
ished conduct which would not be 
blameworthy in the average member 
of the community would be too se-
vere for that community to bear." 
Id., at 50. Its severity lies in the 
absence of an opportunity either to 
avoid the consequences of the law or 
to defend any prosecution brought 
under it. Where a person did not 
know of the duty to register and 
where there was no proof of the 
probability of such knowledge, he 
may not be convicted consistently 
*[355 US 230] 
•with due process. Were it other-
wise, the evil would be as great as it 
is when the law is written in print 
too fine to read or in a language for-
eign to the community. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Burton dissents be-
cause he believes that, as applied to 
this appellant, the ordinance does 
not violate her constitutional rights. 
tion itself. The matter is summar-
ized in United States v Balint, 258 
US 250, 252, 66 L ed 604, 605, 42 S 
Ct 301: "Many instances of this are 
to be found in regulatory measures 
in the exercise of what is called the 
police power where the emphasis 
of the statute is evidently upon 
achievement of some social better-
ment rather than the punishment of 
the crimes as in cases of mala in se." 
Surely there can hardly be a dif-
ference as a matter of fairness, of 
hardship, or of justice, if one may 
invoke it, between the case of a per-
SEPARATE OPINION 
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355 US 225, 2 L ed 
son wholly innocent of wrong doing, 
in the sense that he was not re-
motely conscious of violating any 
law, who is imprisoned for five years 
for conduct relating to narcotics, and 
the case of another person who is 
placed on probation for three years 
on condition that she pay $250, for 
failure, as a local resident, convicted 
under local law of a felony, to reg-
•[355 US 231] 
ister under *a law passed as an exer-
cise of the State's "police power,"1 
Considerations of hardship often 
lead courts, naturally 
Headnote 7 enough, to attribute to a 
statute the requirement 
of a certain mental element—some 
consciousness of wrong doing and 
knowledge of the law's command 
—as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Then, too, a cruelly 
disproportionate relation 
Headnote 8 between what the law 
requires and the sanction 
for its disobedience may constitute 
a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment as a cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and, in respect to the States, 
even offend the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But what the Court here does is 
to draw a constitutional line between 
a State's requirement of doing and 
not doing. What is this but a return 
to Year Book distinctions between 
feasance and nonfeasance—a dis-
tinction that may have significance 
in the evolution of common-law no-
tions of liability, but is inadmissible 
as a line between constitutionality 
and unconstitutionality. One can be 
confident that Mr. Justice Holmes 
1. This case does not involve a person 
who, convicted of a crime in another juris-
diction, must decide whether he has been 
convicted of a crime that "would have been 
punishable as a felony" had it been com-
mitted in California. Appellant committed 
CALIFORNIA 233 
2d 228, 78 S Ct 240 
would have been the last to draw 
such a line. What he wrote about 
"blameworthiness" is worth quoting 
in its context: 
"It is not intended to deny that 
criminal liability, as well as civil, 
is founded on blameworthiness. 
Such a denial would shock the moral 
sense of any civilized community; 
or, to put it another way, a law 
which punished conduct which would 
not be blameworthy in the average 
member of the community would be 
too severe for that community to 
*[355 US 232] 
bear." (This passage *must be read 
in the setting of the broader discus-
sion of which it is an essential part. 
Holmes, The Common Law, at 49, 
50.) 
If the generalization that under-
lies, and alone can justify, this deci-
sion were to be given its relevant 
scope, a whole volume of the United 
States Reports would be required to 
document in detail the legislation in 
this country that would fall or be im-
paired. I abstain from entering upon 
a consideration of such legislation, 
and adjudications upon it, because I 
feel confident that the present deci-
sion will turn out to be an isolated 
deviation from the strong current 
of precedents—a derelict on the 
waters of the law. Accordingly, I 
content myself with dissenting. 
NOTE 
In connection with Lambert v Cali-
fornia (1957) 355 US 225, 2 L ed 2d 
228, 78 S Ct 240, an interesting article 
by Professor Gerhard O. W. Mueller, 
"On Common Law Mens Kea," appears 
in 42 Minn L Rev 1043 (1958). 
forgery in California, and was convicted 
under California law. Furthermore, she 
was convicted in Los Angeles itself, and 
there she resided for over seven years 
before the arrest leading to the present 
proceedings. 
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Citation/Title 
UT ST S 17-16a-5, Compensation for assistance in transaction involving county—Public disclosure 
and filing required 
Utah Code § 17-16a-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 17. COUNTIES 
CHAPTER 16A. COUNTY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES DISCLOSURE ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc, is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 17-16a-5. Compensation for assistance in transaction involving county—Public disclosure and filing required 
(1) No elected or appointed officer may receive or agree to receive compensation for assisting any person or business entity in any 
transaction involving the county in which he is an officer unless he files with the county legislative body a sworn statement giving the 
information required by this section, and discloses in open meeting to the members of the body of which he is a member, immediately 
prior to the discussion, the information required by Subsection (3). 
(2) The statement required to be filed by this section shall be filed ten days prior to the date of any agreement between the elected 
or appointed officer and the person or business entity being assisted or ten days prior to the receipt of compensation by the business 
entity. The statement is public information and is available for examination by the public. 
(3) The statement and disclosure shall contain the following information: 
(a) the name and address of the officer; 
(b) the name and address of the person or business entity being or to be assisted, or in which the appointed or elected official has a 
substantial interest; and 
(c) a brief description of the transaction as to which service is rendered or is to be rendered and of the nature of the service 
performed or to be performed. 
As last amended by Chapter 227, Laws of Utah 1993. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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Citation/Title 
UT ST § 17-16a-10, Violation a misdemeanor—Removal from office 
Utah Code § 17-16a-10 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 17. COUNTIES 
CHAPTER 16A. COUNTY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES DISCLOSURE ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 17-16a-10. Violation a misdemeanor—Removal from office 
In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, any person who knowingly and intentionally violates this part is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall be dismissed from employment or removed from office. 
As last amended by Chapter 241, Laws of Utah 1991. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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Citation/Title 
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Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfullyff; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974. 
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Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law 
with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be 
convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed. 
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974. 
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§ 76-6-409. Theft of services 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation by deception, threat, force, 
or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he 
diverts the services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation services, 
restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers 
for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for 
which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television services, only if the services are obtained 
by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of 
deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9. 
As last amended by Chapter 215, Laws of Utah 1994 
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